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ABSTRACT
We investigate the effects of budgetary policie~ on growth rata, ezternal debt, resl interat rata and
the ~tock market valuation of capital in a two-eountry, overlapping-generationi model of endogenoue
growth. A worldwide ri~e ia the pubGc debt to GDP ratio, or the ~hare of government con~umption,
reducee ~aving~ and growth. Witó adju~tment co~t~ for inve~tment they aLo increa~e real interest
rates end deprw the ~tock market. A relative rise in one country'~ debt to GDP ratio or it~ GDP
share of government consumption rault~ in a reduction in its ratio of ezternal as~et~ to GDP. Growth
rata are equaliied unlm there are di8erenca in investment adjuatment coete or depreciation rates.
Per capits output levels do not necewrily converge.
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The 1980s have witnessed a significant average rise in public debt to GDP ratios
in the main industrial economies. The average net public debt to GDP ratio in the G-7
rose from about 209ó in 1979 to 30oYo in 1989. This rise has been concentrated in the
United States and Europe, as Japan's 1989 public debt to GDP ratio was slightly lower
that in 1979. The average growth rate of the G-7 fell from 3.5oIo in the 1970s to 2.81o in
the 1980s. No conntry escaped this slowdown in economic growth. In addition, world
real interest rates in the 1980s have been higher on average than in the previous decade.
Finally, Japan's external position improved markedly in the 1980s, in contrast to North
America which witnessed a significant deterioration.
This paper investigates the relation between budgetary polities, economic growth
curreat account imbalances, real interest rates and the stock market valuatioa of
capital. We address these issues in the context of a theoretical two~ountry model of
endogenoua growth with overlapping generations. The analysis assumes capital mobility
and focuses on international spillovers from capital accumulation. The main differences
between countries that we assume lie in the efficiency of production and fiscal policies.
We demonstrate that, in the presence of perfect capital mobility, the endogenous
growth rate will be the same in all countries and that relative output levela will not
converge. Relative outputs and capital stocks are determined by exogenous differences
in productive efficiency. The reason for the equality of the endogenoue growth rate ie
the real interest rate equalizatioa implied by perfect capital mobility. As a result, the
marginal product of capital must be the same in both countries. Capital will flow into
the country with the more efficient productive technology until the marginal product of
capital has been equalized in the two countries. After that, capital stocks need to grow
by the same percentage to maintain this equality. Since the rate of growth oí the capital
stock determines the growth rate in this endogenous growth model, growth rates will
then be equal.
With regard to the world economy we demonstrate that savings and growth ratesare lower than in a comparable representative-household economy. In the latter type of
economy all population growth is within the representative household, and there is no
entry of aon-interconnected generations. In our overlapping-generations model
households are not coacerned about the welfare of yet uaborn agents, and therefore save
less than if they were. Since the savings rate determines the rate of capital
accumulation, aad the latter determines the growth rate, growth will be slower in an
overlapping-generations economy. We also demonstrate that the growth rate falls with
increases in both the average public debt to GDP ratio and the average GDP share of
public coasumption. This is because both reduce global savings and, hence, capital
accumulation. Such growth effects do not arise in representative-household economiea
(see Alogoskoufis and van der Plceg 1990 a,b).
With regard to differencea between countries, we demonstrate that a relative
increase in the public debt to GDP ratio and the GDP ahare of public consumption
produces a relative fall in the ratio of external assets to GDP for the country that
experiences it. This is because of the fall in its savings rate (private plus public). On
impact, the fall in the national savings rate is higher than in steady state, and the
economy enters an adjustment path along which it ~cperiences higher current account
deficits and a rising external debt to GDP ratio.
We also examine the case where there are convex adjustment costs for investment.
If both countries face the same adjustment costa, then endogenons growth rates are
again equalized. The equilibrium global growth rate is lower than in the absence of
adjustment costs, while the equilibrium world real interest rate is lower. Higher average
public debt to GDP ratios bring about an increase in the world real interest rate and
reduce the global growth rate and the stock market valuation of capital. If countries
have different investment adjustment costs, then the equilibrium growth rates are no
longer equal. The economy in which investment is relatively more costly to adjust ends
up growing more slowly. If one assumes that countriea have different rates of3
depreàation of the capital atock, then the country with the higher depreciation rate
grows more alowly.
The results auggest that a two~ountry overlapping generationa model of
endogenous growth can account for the eventa of the 1980a in terms of budgetazy
poliàes. The fall in the average growth rate and the increase in world real intereat rates
could be the result of the average rise in public debt to GDP ratios. So could events
auch as the atock mazket crash of 1987. The higher current account defiàta in countriea
such as the United Statea can be seen ae a reflection of the relative rise in public deficits
and public debt that they experienced. This latter result also obtains in ezogenous
growth, overlapping generations modele, but such modele cannot account for the growth
effecta of budgetary policiea (see Frenkel and Razin 1988, Obatfeld 1989, van der Plceg
1990 and Alogoskoufis 1990).
The rest of the paper is as followe: Section I presents a model of overlapping
generations and eadogenous growth. The household sector consists of houaeholda with
finite horizone and there ia entry of new householda which are not intergenerationally
linked. This createa a consumption externality, as households aze not conceraed with the
welfare of future generations, and save lesa than otherwise. Alternatively, there ia a
problem of missing mazkets, as current generationa caz~not trade with yet unborn
generations. Since savinga determine investment in equilibrium, the inveatment rate is
inefficiently low. The product market is competitive, but there aze production
externalitiea írom the capital stcek (or "knowledge") of other firma at home and abroad.
Because of these production externalitiea, the private return of capital falls ahort of ita
social return. As a result firma use less capital thaa is soàally desirable, and the
equilibrium growth rate is ineffiàently low. The government finances public
consumption by either lump~um taxes, or public debt. It is asaumed throughout that
the government is aolvent. Section II considers a two~ountry world in which both
countries produce goods that aze perfect substitutea in consumption. Their only4
differencea aze in fiscal poliáes and the ef8ciency of production. There are no barriera to
intemational trade in goods or capital. Section III derives the equilibrium, díacussea its
propertiea, and conaiders the effects of altemative budgetary poliáea on the global
growth rate. Section IV analysea relative budgetary poliáea, and their effect on eztemal
debt. Section V discusses an extension of the model to allow for investment adjustment
costs. Section VI containa conclusiona.
I. A Model ofOverlapping Generations and Endogenous Growth
Coneider a world economy with no barriers to trade, and in which each individual
economy produces goods that aze perfect substitutes in conaumption. As a consequence,
the law of one price holda.
Each economy consists of a lazge number of competitive 5rma, and a population of
householda which grows at the rate n. The govemment spends on public goods, can levy
lump-sum taxes and iasue debt. Householda have no intergenerational bequest motive.
New houaeholda enter the economy at a rate ~, and all households face a conatant
probability of eatinction J~ at each instant. Thus, the model, which is based on
Alogoakoufis and vaa der Plceg (1990 b), incorporates the uncertain lifetimes approach
of Yaari (1965) and Blanchazd (1985), with the entry of new households that aze not
conaected to previous generationa, as in the model of Weil (1989). Weil (1989) and
Buiter (1988) have shown that the entry of new householda, unconnected to previoue
generations, i.e a positive birth rate of houaeholds, is auffiáent for departures from
Ricardian debt neutrality (Barro 1974).
I.1 Howeho(da and A99regate Conaamption
At time t, a houaehold born at instant v solves the following problem,5
-~
Max re-(v}a)(,-!)( c v 9~-' lds
e( D,,) J t l 1-,-1 J
subject to the instantaneous ílow budget identity,
(1)
da v t-[r(t)-l-aJa(v,t) a- ~(v,t) - T(v,t) - c(v,t) (2)
where c is consumption, a is non-human wealth, m is the gross instantaneous non-asset
income of the household, and T is the instantaneous tax she pays to the government. p is
the pure rate of time preference, o is the elasticity of intertemporal subsitution, and r is
the instantaneous real interest rate. The term ~a is an actuarially fair life insurance
premium, so that when households are alive they receive an extra return a on their
non-human wealth from insurance companies, and when they die their estate
(non-human wealth) accrues to their insurance company. This set-up correaponds to a
competitive insurance industry with free entry.
Under the requirement that households are solvent, and that the real interest rate
is time invariant, as will be ahown to be the case in equilibrium, one obtains the
following utility maximizing consumption function for the individual household.
c(v,t) - [afopf(1-o)r)[a(v,t) f h(v,t) ~ (3)
where h(v,t) denotea human wealth. This is defined as,
h(v't) - ~~-(r~-a)(a-!)[!J(U,9)-T(v,9)~d9 (4)
t6
In what follows we shall assume that newly born households do not inherit any
non-human wealth, but that non~asset income m and taxes r aze independent of the age
of the household. The fraction of the cohort born at time v which is still alive at time t
is AL(v)e-~~t-"~ - ~ee'e-~t, where L(v) - e"' denotes the size oí the population at time
v. This can be used to define population aggregates, say, C(t) -~e-atf t c(v,t)e~"dv. It
m
is straightforwazd to show that aggregate consumption and non-human wealth evolve
according to,
C(t) - (o(r-p)fnJC(t) - ~(a-1-op-I-(1-v)r)A(t) (5)
A(t) - rA(t) -~- n (t) - T(t) - C(t) (6)
Population growth appeazs in (5) because this refers to aggregate consumption.
The probability of death a does not appear in (6), as the insuraace premia receàved by
the surviving households are equal to the non-human wealth of those who die.
Therefore,the probability of death does not affect the aggregate return on assets.
The menu of assets held by householda consists of physical capital K, government
debt D, and external assets F, so that A- KfDfF.
I.2 Technobgy and tht Behnviour of Firma
Each economy COIIB18t8 of a lazge number of identical competitive firms. The
objective oí these firms is to max7mize their net worth. ~
Technology of firm j is given by,
vlj,t) - ek(j,t)n~K(t)~'K.(t)r-n~-n~ ; e~o, o~n~fn~~l (7)where B, ni and pz are constant technological parametere, k(j,t) deaotee the capital atock
of firm j at inetant t, K(t) denotea the average capital atock in the economy, and K'(t)
denotes the average foreign capital atcek. These two latter terma capture the external
(or "knowledge") effecta of aggregate capital deepening in the economy and the rest of
the world. Arrow (1982) and Romer (1986) have stresaed euch extetnal eHecta in the
contezt of a closed economy. Our model is the apecial case of the Romer model with
conatant returas to aggregate capital accumulation at the world level.i
Firm j chooaes a path for ita capital stock that solvea the following problem.
~m -! tT~Y~tI
Max J (y(j,v)-k(j,v)-ák(j,v)Je dv (8)
k(i~D) t
The terma in bracketa denote the inatantaneoua profita of firm j. á ia the rate of
depreciation of the capital atock.
The 5rat order condition for a ma~mum entails,
r(t) - nie ( k t 1 nt-1 r K t 1 ns - á (9)
(9) ie the condition that the marginal product of capital ia equal to the uaer coat of
capital rfó. Since all domeatic firma have the same technology and face the same
market and non-market conatrainte (real intereat rate and average domeatic and foreign
,
capital etocka), they will all choose the same capital stock. Thus, in domeatic
equilibrium, k(j,t) - K(t) for all 5rm8. The domestic asset market equilibrium condition
then is,
~Romer (1989) ~urveys the rapidly ezpanding literature on endogenoui growth.a
r(t)-n~e( Kt,n-1 -b
where n - p~fqz.
On the other hand, aggregating (7) 8cr088 firms, the domestic aggregate
production function is,
Y(t) - BK(t)nK'(t)1-~ (11)
I.3 The Goverament
The government finances public consumption C, and interest payments on its debt
rD, by erther lump~um taxation T, or borrowing D. This gives rise to the flow budget
identity of the government,
D(t) - rD(t) ~- G(t) - T(t) (12)
Solvency oí the government requires that the sum of the current public debt and
the present value of future public consumption does not exceed the present value of
future taxes:
~e-~~'-~~G(s)da f D(t) ( ~e-'~'-~~T(s~a
n. ATwo-Country World
(12~)
Consider a two~ountry world. Preferences are the same in both countries, and9
there aze no barriers to goods or capital flows across countriea. Since the goods produced
in any country are perfect aubstitutes in consumption, the law of one price will hold.
Also, since asaets aze petfect substitutes iaternationally, both countries will face the
same real interest rate.
We assume that there are two differences across countries. The first is in the
efficiency of production, and will be parametrized in terms of differences in B's. The
second difference reíers to fiacal poliáes. Countries are indexed by subscript i- 1,2.
II.1 Aastt Marktt Equitibriam
The condition of perfect capital mobility impliea that real interest rates will be
equal across countries. From (10), and the aasumptíon that the pazameter B differa
across countries, we get that the world interest rate and relative capital intensities aze
determined by the condition that,
ritJ - O~Bt( K t
l s
n-1 ( K t
- 6 - niesl s
1-p
-ó (13)
(13) can be solved for the equilibrium world real interest rate, and the ratio of the
equilibrium capital stocks.
fltl - n~(e~esl'~Z - ó
~
~ - ~ e~~tn-~i
(14)
(15)
From (14), the equilibrium world real interest rate is time invariant as was
assumed in section I.1 above. It depends positively on the parametera that increase the10
marginal productivity of capital atocka, and negatively on the rate of depreciation of
capital.
From (15), the country which, ceteris pariów, is more productive in ita use of
capital, will end up with the higher capital atock. Substituting (15) in the aggregate






(lóa) and (lób) imply that, in equilibrium, the two economies will have the same
capital~utput ratio, which is constant and determined by the geometric average of B~
and B~. In both countriea, equilibrium output turns out to be proportional to the
aggregate capital atock.
If growth in the level of domestic product is defined as ryi(t) s f.(t)~Yi(t), then,
from the aggregate production functions (16a) and (lób), the growth rates of the capital
atocks are also equal to ryi(t). Since from (15) the equilibrium ratio of capital stocks is
conatant, it followe that the equilibrium growth rates in the two economies must be
equal. Thus, in this model there is no convergence of output levels. "Poor" (low B)
countries have a lower output and capital stock than "rich" (high B) countries, but a
common growth rate. Hence output levele do not converge. The rate of change of
labour~augmenting technical progress, or the per~apita growth rate, is defined as
~r(t) - ry(t) - n. To the eztent that both countriea have the same rate of population
growth, the endogenous growth rate in per~apita output ia the same for both countriea.
However, if the "poor" country had a higher rate of population growth, then its
per~apita output growth would be lower than that of the "rich" country.11
Combining (18a), (16b) and (14) note that (rfb)Ki(t) - n~(d~B~)1~tKs(t) c Yi(t).
Domestic output exceeds payments to owners of private capital. This is because
domestic and international spillovera of knowledge induce additional income for which
individual firms do not need to pay. We shall asaume that theee profite are handed over
to the owners of the firma (the household sectors) in a manner that does not depend on
their age. This ia consistent with our assumption in I.1 that m(v,t) - m(t), i.e
independent of the age of the household. Therefore, f2(t) -(1-p~Y(t).
To summarize, this section has demonstrated that the equilibrium world real
interest rate only depends on exogenoua technological parameters. The relative capital
stocks and output levels of the two economies only depend on differencea in production
efficiency, and the capital~utput ratio will be the same in both countries. We have also
demonstrated that the growth rate of GDP will be the same in both countriea, and that
there will be no tendency for economic convergence.
II.2 Gooda and Labour Marktt Eqailiórium
Equilibrium in product marketa requires that the sum of private consumptíon,
public consumption and investment equals national income. National income consists of
domestic income Y, plus intereat payments on external assets. Thus, in each economy,
the product market equilibrium condition is,
Yi(t) t rFi(t) - Cs(t) f Ki(t) f bKi(t) f Gi(t) f Fi(t) (17)
(17) is based on the íamiliar accounting identity in an open economy, that
national income is equal to absorption plus the current account. The current account is
equal to the accumulation of external assets. (17) can be re-arranged to give the ílow12
budget identity for the economy as a whole.
Ki(i) f Fi(t) - Yi(t) t rFs(t) - Cs(t) - 6Ki(t) - Cti(t) (17')
Labour supply is a constant fraction of the population, and equilibrium in the
labour market ensures that all supply is employed.
II.3 Summary
It is convenient to formulate the two~ountry model in terms of fractions of
domestic product. These fractions are denoted by lowercase rather than capital lettera,
i.e, c(t) - C t . The model then is as followa:
ci(t) - [o(r-p)fn-7(t)Ici(t) - t?[opf(1-a)r-faJ[k-~-d{(tJ-~-Íi(tJI (18)
d;(t) -[r-7(t)Id~(t) f 9t - Ti, df(o) - d~ (IS)
Í{(t) -1 - [7(t)f6~ - ci(t) - gi t [r-ry~(t)Jj; (20)
k - B-' ; B - (B~B~)'~t (21)
Ett~mt(i(t) - 0 (22)
(18)~20) are, reapectively, the consumption function, the government flow budget
identity and the product market equilibrium condition for each economy. We have uaed
the equilibrium condition that the rates of growth of capital atocks and, therefore,13
growth rates are the same for both countries. (21) ís the equilibrium capital-output
ratio, which is the same in both countries, and equal to the geometric average of B, and
B~. Finally, (22) is derived from the familiar budget identity that the foreign borrowing
of country 1 equals the foreign lending of country 8. atit refers to the share of country i's
GDP in world GDP. The GDP shares are time independent in this model. It is
straightforward to show that tbi - 1~(If(B~B~)-l~~t~r-~~~J. Obviously, ~~ - 1-~~.
The simplest way to solve the model is to use the method of Aoki ( 1981), and
consider the model of averages and the model of differences.
III. Budgetary Policies, Savings and Endogenous Growth
in the World Economy
We shall first consider the determination of worldwide averages. By using their
respective shares in world GDP to take the weighted average of the consumption
íunctions ( 18), the government flow-budget identities (19), and the product market
equilibrium conditions (20) for the two countries, after making use of (21) and (22), we
end up with the following average model for the world economy:
cA(t) - (o(r-p)fn-7(tJkq(t) - Qlopf(1-o)rfaJ(B-'~-dA(tII (23)
dA(tJ - lr-7lt)IdA~tJ f 9A - TA' dA~~J - dAo
(24)
7i~J - -6 f B(1-cAitJ-9A ~ (25)
Subscript A denotes that the relevant variables refer to global weighted averages.
Note that we have made use of (21) to substitute for the average capital-output ratio,14
and (22) which showe that the average external asset to GDP ratio is zero.
III.1 Btidgttary Policwa, Prsroate Sarring~ and the Worid Crowth Rate
We 5rst consider the determination of the average GDP ahaze of world private
consumption and the endogenous world growth rate, under the assumption of a constant
world public debt to GDP ratio. This assumption will be satis5ed if taxes adjust
instantaneouely to stabilize public debt. Thus, we concentrate on (23) and (25),
assuming that the average shaze of taxes is determined by,
T~q(t) - ~r-ry(tJÍdA(tJ f 9A (24')
World equilibrium is depicted in Figure 1. B-R (the Blanchazd-Romer locus)
depicts the steady-state consumption function. It is the locus of consumption-growth
combinations that are consistent with the plans of private consumers, and a constant
GDP shaze of private consumption. Assuming a dynamically efficient world economy, in
which the real interest rate exceeds the pure rate of time preference, i.e, that n,~6 ~ p,
the B-R locus is defined for per-capita growth rates lower than a(n,8-b-p). The steady
state consumption function asymptotically approaches the vertical R-R locus, which
represents the Ramsey (1928~Romer (1986) condition that the world per-capita growth
rate is equal to the difference between the real interest rate and the pure rate of
preference, weighted by the elasticity of intertemporal substitution. This condition, the
modified golden-rule, is satisfied at the point ry~ - n f o(n,8-ó-p).
The downward-sloping H-D line is the product market equilibrium condition (25).
It is essentially a modified Hazrod-Domar condition for the world economy. Cete~is
pa~rióus, a lower average shaze of private consumption in the world economy leaves more
room for investment, and the higher investment rate produces more growth. Unlike the15
model with decreasing returns to aggregate capital, growth never ceases in this model.
World equilibrium is at E~, the intersectioa of the B-R and H-D loá. Since both
consumption and the growth rate are jump variables, there are no traasient dynamica ia
the case of a fized public debt to GDP ratio. Private consumption and the growth rate
jump to ensure equilibrium in the global economy.
The equilibrium shaze of consumption is higher, and the equilibrium growth rate
lower that in the case of an infinite horizon, representative household global economy.
This is because of the entry of new, non-intergenerationally linked householde, which
cannot trade with current households. This creates a consumption externality and
reduces growth. Without this externality, the equilibrium is at E~` ~, the intersection of
the H-R and R-R loá. In the representative household economy, the only growth rate
which is compatible with a constant GDP share of private consumption is the
Ramsey-Romer growth rate, ry' - n f a(n~B-b-p). In that case budgetazy poliáes
cannot afíect growth rates. Only poliáes that can affect the mazginal product of capital
affect growth in such an economy (see Bazro and Sala-i-Martin 1990).
We turn now to two fiscal policy ezperiments. The 5rst is a tax fiaanced, steady
state rise ia the world public debt to GDP ratio, and the second is a global balanced
budget increase in government consumption.
A global rise in the public debt~GDP ratio ehifts the B-R locus to the left. Higher
public debt raises consumption at a given growth rate, as part of the lump-sum taxes
that will finance the interest payments on the higher public debt are paid by yet unbora
generations, for which current generations are not concemed. In equilibrium, the riae ia
world consumption will reduce the growth rate, as it crowds out capital accumulation.
Thus, the new equilibrium at El ie associated with higher private consumption and a
lower growth rate. Such an effect does not arise in the case of a representative household
global economy, as ia this case government bonds are not wealth (Barro 1974), and the
method of finanáng government expenditure does not affect private consumption.16
A balanced budget global rise in the shaze of government consumption shifts the
H-D locus. In the new equilibrium E2, both private consumption and the growth rate
fall relative to the original equilibrium at EQ The higher taxes uaed to finance the rise
in government consumption crowd out private coneumption, but this r~owding~ut is
less than one-for-one, since pazt of the higher taxes aze paid by new,
non-intergenerationally linked households. As a result of this, the sum oí global private
and government consumption risea, total savings and investment get crowded-out, and
the growth rate falls. Such an effect dces not arise in the representative household
economy, in which there ia one-for~ne crowding out of private consumption. In that
case the economy moves from E` to E''.
III.2 27~t Dynamíc Adjeutment of World Snroinga, Puótic Deót nnd Endogenow Growth
In thie section we concentrate on dynamics. We consider the effects of a transitory
tax cut on the dynamic adjustment of the average GDP share of private consumption,
public debt and endogenous growth in the world economy. For this purpose we use the
average model consisting of equations (23) to (25). We supplement the model by a tax
rule which is assumed to ensure solvency of the public sector. This tax rule takes the
form,
rA(t) - ra - ridA(t) (26)
(26) replaces the tax rule (24'). Unlike (24') which assumes immediate adjustment to
ensure a stable public debt to GDP ratio, (26) implies gradual adjustment.
Substituting (26) in (24), and the growth rate equation (25) in (23) and (24), we
end up with the following model for the average GDP share of private consumption and
the average public debt to GDP ratio.cA(t) - [o(r-p)fnfá-B(1-gA)JcA(t) f 9cÁ(t)
- (i[opf(1-o)rtaJ[B-'fdA(t)J (z7)
dA(t) -[rfó-B(1-gA)-riJdA(t) f BcA(t)dA(t) f gA - ro, (28)
The condition for government solvency is that ri ~ r-ryA - rfá-B(1-cA-gA)'
The equilibrium a.nd the asaociated dynamics are depicted in Figure 2. The iceus
associated with a conatant ahaze of consumption is negatively aloped for low ahazes of
private consumption, aince a low shaze of private consumption leaves more room for
investment. This resulta in a per-capita growth rate that is higher than the difference of
the real interest rate and the pure rate of time preference weighted by the elasticity of
intertemporal subatitution. The slope of the locua turns poaitive at the point where the
share of conaumption is high enough to ensure a per-capita growth rate lower than thie
latter difference. This is at the point cÁ -~ cÁ. cÁ - 1-gA-B-~[o(r-p)fnfáJ
denotes the equilibrium GDP shaze of consumption associated with the Ramsey-Romer
rule, i.e a representative household economy. ~cÁ also denotes the minimum average
public debt to GDP ratio, or the highest percenta.ge of GDP that the private sector is
prepared to borrow from governments. Note that the Ramsey-Romer share of private
consumption is an equilibrium in the model with overlapping generations when
governments hold assets equal to the average private capital stock, dA --1~8.
The locus associated with a constant average public debt to GDP ratio slopes
upwazds as long as cA does not exceeed c" - 1-gAf B-~(r~-r-6). Thia is the
condition for government solvency.
There aze three potential equilibria. EI can be ruled out because it impliea
negative average world conaumption, whereas E~ ia nnatable. Therefore, ES ia the onlyiR
meaningfull steady etate equilibrium, as it is saddlepoint stable which is sensible since
dA ie a predetermined variable and cA a non-predetermined variable. Ep is the steady
state equilibrium in the representative household economy. Compazing ES and E~ one
notes that the absence of an intergenerational bequest motive leads to a higher GDP
share of private consumption, and a higher public debt to GDP ratio.
Intertemporal shifts in taxation do not affect the GDP shaze of prívate
consumption in the representative household economy. This is because of Ricazdian
neutrality. Such shifts only afíect the average public debt to GDP ratio (i.e shifts along
the R-R curve). In our overlapping generations model, a cut in ro shifts the dA-o locus
to the right, increases the shaze of private consumption to GDP, reduces the growth
rate, and increases the public debt to GDP ratio (Figure 3). The short run efíects imply
an increase in private consumption (shift from E to A), because pazt of the future tazes
will be paid by yet unborn generations. As a result, global savings and the growth rate
fall on impact. Over time, there is a rise of the average public debt to GDP ratio which
causes further reductions in the savings rate and the growth rate. It also induces
increases in the ahaze of taxes (through 26), which in the end bring us to the new steady
etate E', with a higher shaze of consumption and a lower growth rate.
To summarize, in this section we have investigated the determination of global
savings and endogenous growth. We demonstrated that the world savings and growth
rates aze lower than in a representative-household global economy, and that increases in
both public debt and government consumption reduce the world GDP shaze of total
savings and the global growth rate.
We now turn to the effects oí differences in fiscal policies between countries.
Iv. R.elative Budgetary Policies and External Debt
We now turn to the model of differences between countries. This will be used toexamine the effecta of differencea in budgetary policiea.
Subtracting the model (18x20) of country 2, from the model of country 1, we get
the íollowing model of differences:
cR(t) - (o(r-p)-hn-7lcR(t) - ~(opf(1-o)r-~-.~1ldR(t)ffR(t)1 (29)
dR(t) -~r-7)dR(t) } 9R - TIZ, dR(~) - dRo
fR(t) - ir-1'~fR - Í ~R(t) f 9R !
(30)
(31)
where subacript R denotea the difference of the relevant ratio between country 1 and
country 8.
IV.1 lattantaneotia Adju,ttment ofRdatioe Taxea
We ahall again concentrate firat on experimenta with constant relative public debt
to output ratioe. Thue, relative tax rates are asaumed to adjust inatantaneoualy to
atabilize the relative public debt to GDP ratios. Section IV.2 examinea the etability of
the relative model when the relative tax rates adjust sluggiahly.
With a constant relative public debt to GDP ratio, the model conaiata of (29) and
(31). It determinea the differences in GDP ahazea of private conaumption, and the
differencea in net external asaet to GDP ratios.
The equilibrium is depicted in Figure 4. The conatant relative conaumption locus
has a poaitive alope, as in world equilibrium ry c o(r-p) f n. If country 1 has a higher
public debt to GDP ratio than country 2, thie locua will have a poaitive intercept with
the vertical axie. The alope of the locua oí conatant relative fore.iga asaeta could be eitherzo
poaitive or negative, depending on whether the resl intereet rate ezceeds o: falla ahort oí
the common growth rate. The case depicted in Figure 3 is based on the assumption than
r~ ry. It is also asaumed that the GDP shaze of public conaumption in country 1 is
higher than in country 2.
The necessazy and sufficient condition for the equilibrium to be saddlepoint stable
ia that,
~~op~-(1-a)r~-a~~ ~o(r-p)fn-ryllr-71 (32)
This condition will be satisfied if individual houaeholds aze solvent, and is assumed in
Figure 4. It is atraightíorward to see that if r ~ ry, (32) is satisfied if o ~{fp.
We next conaider the implications of a tax financed rise in the relative debt to
GDP ratio of country 1, and a tax 5nanced increase in ita relative share of government
consumption. These two experiments aze depicted in Figure 5.
Figure 5a depicta the case of a ateady atate increase in the public debt to GDP
ratio of country 1, relative to country 2, leaving the average public debt to GDP ratio
unaffected. Thie ahifta the conatant relative consumption locus to the left, and the aew
equilibrium E' is asaociated with higher relative conaumption, and a higher external
debt for country 1. Initially relative consumption overshoots its ateady atate increase, as
ita jumpa to put the economies at E~ on the negatively sloping saddlepath.
Subaequently, the relative ahare of private consumption is falling as country 1
decumulates foreign asaeta (accumulates foreign debt). Thua the adjuatment path ia
chazacterized by higher than ateady atate relative consumption for country 1, and a
current account deficit. Thia pattern could explain the relative position of the USA in
the 5rst part of the 1980s.
Figure 5b depicta the case of a relative increase in the share of government
consumption in country 1. Thia ahifts the constant foreign asseta locus to the right, and21
in the new steady state equilibrium country 1 hae a lower relative ratio of private
consumption to GDP, and a higher external debt. The initiall fall in relative
consumption undershoots the steady state fall. However, as there is decumulation of
foreign assets (accumulation of foreign debt) along the new saddlepath, the relative
consumption share gradually approaches its lower equilibrium value at E'.
To recapitulate, we have shown than in a world of full capital mobility, aa
increase in the pnblic debt to GDP ratio in one country will cause a reduction ia its
relative GDP share of private (and national) savíngs to GDP, and a rise in its e~ernal
debt to GDP ratio. On impsct, the reduction in private savings is higher than in steady
state, and the economy enters an adjustment path along which it experiences higher
current account de6cits and a rising external debt to GDP ratio. On the other hand, a
(relative) rise in the output share of public consumption also reduces national savings,
as the reduction in the (relative) GDP shaze of private consumption is lower than the
increase ia the share of public consumption. As on impact the reduction in the relative
GDP share of private consumption undershoots the eteady state fall, the economy
experiences an adjustment path characterized by higher current account deficita, a rising
:acternal debt to GDP ratio, and a falling GDP share of private consumption.
IV.2 The Dynamie Adjratment ofRtlativt Snroinga, Ezternd Deót and Publie Debt
In this section we consider the stability of the relative model in (29}~31), under
gradual adjustment of relative tax rates to stabilize differencee in the public debt to
GDP ratio. Thus, the taz rule takes the form,
rR - ro t r~dR (33)
Substituting (33) in (30), the chazacterietic polyaomial of the amended dynamic22
system (29x31) is given by,
(r-ry-r~-p){ ~C~-[(Ifa)r-Sry-apfn,~u -~[apf(1-a)r-FaJt[a(r-p)fn-ryJ(r-ry) } - 0
Since the system COa818t8 of one non-predetermined and two predetermined
variables, saddlepath stability requires two atable (negative) roots and one unstable
(positive) one. It is atraightforwazd to see that in the case where the public sectors are
solvent, i.e Ti J r-7, saddlepath stability is satisfied if (32) is also satisfied, i.e if the
private sectors aze also solvent. If the public sector is solvent, the root associated with
public debt is givea by pl - r-ry-r~ C 0, whíle if the private sector ia solvent, (32 is
satisfied), the product of the other two roots will be negative, suggesting that one is
negative and the other positive. Hence, the saddlepath condition will be satisfied.
Thus, a relative increase ia the shaze of government coasumption in one country
will lead to a gradual build-up of public and e~cternal debt, and a gradual increase in the
relative share of taxea in the country. Thus, while the relative shares of private
consumption aze not affected initially, there will be a subsequent gradual reduction in
the relative share of private consumption for the country that hae experienced the
relative increase in government consumption. In the new equilibrium, the relative ratios
of public and external debt to GDP for the expanding country will have risen, and the
relative ratio of private consumption will have fallen. On the other hand, if the initial
expansion has been through a relative reduction in the GDP shaze of taxes, relative
private consumption will rise on impact. Subsequently, it will start falling, as the
build-up ia relative public debt induces a gradual increase in the GDP ahaze of taxes. In
the new steady state the relative GDP shaze of private coasumption will be lower for
the country that has experienced the initial tax cut, and the relative GDP shazes of
taxes, public debt and extemal debt will be higher.v. Adjustment Costs for Investment, Real Interest Rates,
Stock Mazkets and Economic Growth
One of the most unsatisfactory aspects of the model used so far is the prediction
that the equilibrium world real intereet rate only depends on technological parameters,
and is independent of demand factors, including the average public debt to GDP ratio.
As we have shown elsewhere (Alogoskoufis and van der Plceg 1990 b), the interest rate
can become endogenous in this type of model if one assumes that investment is subject
to adjustment costs. The purpose of this section is to investigate the implications of this
extension in our model oí interdependent economies.
We assume that firms in both economies face costs of adjusting investment.
Instead of (8), firm j chooses a rate of investment that solves the following problem.
-IDr(s~dr
Max ~{ y(j,v)-(1 t f ~ v)I(j,v) }e ~ dv (34)
r(i ,9) t
The maximization is subject to the production function (7) and the accumulation
equation,
k(j,v) - IiÍ,v) - 6k(1,v) (35)
I(j,v) denotes gIO88 investment of firm j at time v, and the cost of adjustment is
proportional to the ratio of its gross investment to its capital stock. t!r is the factor of
proportionality, and measures the intensity of adjustment costa. The first order
conditions tor a maximum are,24
9(1,t) - 1 f
I7,t (36)
~r(t)}b 9 7,t )9(j,t) - fiB( k t 1 fi-1(
K t 1 ns- ~rl',t Q
(37)
q denotes the value of capital to the firm (Tobin's "Q"). The interpretation of (36) ia
that the marginal cost of adjustiag the capital stock plus the coet of investment goods
muat equal the value of capital to the firm. The interpretation oí (37) is that the
interest chazge, plus the depreciation chazge, minus capital gains on equity should equal
the marginal productivity oí capital, plua the marginal reduction in adjustment costs
arising from an additional unit of capital.
Since all domestic firma have the same technology and face the same mazket and
non-market constraints, they will all choose the same investment rate and capital stock.
Thus, as before, in domeatic asset market equilibrium, q(j,t) - q(t), k(j,t) - K(t) for all
firms. Thus, in domestic asset market equilibrium,
9(t) - 1 f 2 1 t (38)
~r(t)fb-~)9(t) - n~e( K t
J
n-1- ~( I t Q (39)
where n- n~fns and .(38) and (39) determine the relation between the real interest
rate r and the equilibrium (stock) mazket valuation oí domeatic capital q, as functions of
technological pazameters, the rate of investmeat, and the world capital stock.
V.1 A~et Market Eqaíliórsum ia a Two-Country Worid
We shall assume a two~ountry world as before. From the assumption of perfect
capital mobility, real interest rates and user costa of capital must be equalized. Thus, wez:
shall hRVe that,
r~(t) - rs(t) - r(t) (40)
~r(t)f6-ql t ~q~(t) - ~r(t)fá q~ t ~qs(t)
where (40) has been used in (41).
From (41),
(41)
9i(t)-qs(t) - Ír(t)fó~~9i(t)-qs(t) ~ (42)
Since (42) is unstable, and the difference in q's is a non-predetermined variable, it
will jump to ensure that q~(t) - q~(t). Thus, the condition of perfect capital mobility
impLes that both real interest rates and the stock market values of capital are equalized
across countries. If the user cost of capital in country i is higher than in country 2,
capítal wili flow into country 2, booeting investment, causing an increase in q and the
usex cost of capital, until the gross investment ratios and q's are equalized. Thus, in a
two country world in which the only difference between countries is in the value of B,
world aaset mazkzt equilibrium must satisfy,
q(t) - 1 f I t- 1~- I~ t
i a
~r(t)fb-~rf,1q(t) -




From (43), firms in both conntries will choose the same rate of gross iavestment.
This will ensure that the marginal cost of adjusting the capital stock and the stock
market value of capital q will be the same in both. Using the equilibrium condition (43)
in (44), the latter reduces to the requirement that the mazginal productivity of capital
must be the same in both countries. From this latter requirement, the equilibrium ratio
of capital stocks is given as in (15), and the equilibrium world real interest rate is given
by,
r(t)-qt -6f B- ~-lE (45)
where B-(B1Bz)1~Z. In equilibrium, as long as the gross investment rate is
non-negative, there will be a negative relation between the stock mazket and real
interest tates.
It is straightforward to see that the limit of (45) as ~ tends to zero is equatioa
(14). It is also straightforwazd to see that in equilibrium, and for a constant technology,
aggregate output is proportional to the aggregate capital stock in each economy, as in
(16a) and (lób), with B being the factor of proportionality. Thus, the results derived in
section II.1 will hold. In pazticular, the equilibrium capital~utput ratio will be the
same in both countries and both countries will be growing at the same rate, as they
have the same gross investment rate. The gross investment rate ís equal to the rate oí
depreciation plus the rate of growth of the capital stock. Because of the linearity of the
equilibrium output equations in the capital stock, the gross investment rate will be
equal to the sum of the growth rate and the depreciation rate. Therefore, I(t)~K(t) -
ry(t)f6. Thus, the equilibrium relations between the growth rate, the stock market value
of capital and real interest rates are given by,27
r(t)-qt -6f }- 7t fó (47)
In equilibrium, and for a constant technology, there will be a positive relation
between the global growth rate and the stock market valuation of 5rms, and a negative
retation between the world real interest rate and the growth rate.
V.2 Budgetary Policrea, Endogenou~ Growfh and Externd Deót
We next turn to the question of the determination oí the endogenous growth rate
and external debt in the world economy. We shall confine ourselves to steady states.
In steady state, the relation between the real interest rate and the growth rate
that satisfíea global asset mazket equilibrium is given by setting q- o in (47). Dropping
the time index, this gives us the following asset market equilibrium condition.
r--6f B- f-ó
f ryf
q(t) - 1 f t~b[ry(t)-I-b~ (48)
(48)
For product market equilibrium in the world economy, we use the ateady state
vere~ons oí the average consumption function (23) and the Hazrod-Domar condition
(25). This gives us,
9[~p~-(1-0) rfa J[ ~ ~- d,41
(49) ry-o(r-p)fn- f
-9,q- 7
The product market equilibrium condition (49) defines a positive relation between28
the rea] interest rate and the growth rate, as long as (pfJ~)~(ry-n) ~ 1 ó. A rise in the
real interest rate will, ceterv paribus, reduce the world GDP ahaze of private
consumption, increase the ahare of world savings, and cause an increase in capital
accumulation and the growth rate.
General equilibrium is depicted in Figure 6. The downwazd aloping locus is the
asset mazket equilibrium condition (48), and the upward sloping locus is the product
market equilibrium condition (49). The preaence of adjustmeat coate for iavestment
results in a lower equilibrium real rate of ínterest, and a lower growth rate. This result
ia independent of whether R.icazdian debt neutrality holds.
A tax financed steady state rise in the average government debt to GDP ratio, or
the GDP shaze of government consumption will cause a rise in the world real intereat
rate and a reduction in the endogenous growth rate. From (46), the stock mazkets will
fall.
With regard to relative budgetazy policiea, the analysis of section IV fully applies.
A relative rise in the public debt to GDP ratio, or the GDP shaze of public consumption
will cauae a fall in relative savings and a rise in external debt for the country that
experiences it.
It is also worth noting that the model with adjustment costs for investment
explains an empirical puszle found in the literature. If Ricazdian debt neutrality holda
and preferencee are stable, only technological shocka (and distortionary taxes) can cause
shifta in the real interest rate. By shifting the asset mazket equilibrium locus (Figure 6),
they induce a positive correlation between real interest rates and growth ratea.
However, it has not been possible in the literature to document such a poaitive
correlation between real intereat rates and growth rates. This auggests that one must
make allowances for ahifts in tàe gooda market equilibrium locus as well. Barro and
Sala~-Maztin (1990) achieve that in a framework of imperïect competition with
technical progresa involving new types of consumer products. This is akin to a change in29
the pure rate of time prefereace, and they euggest that thie factor ie at leaet as
significant as technical change involving varieties of capital goods. Our present analysis
offers an alternative eolution to the above puzzle, that also worke in a framework of
perfect competition. In our framework, unlike the representative household modele,
changes in budgetary policiea lead to ahifts in the goods market equilibrium locus in
Figure 6. Snch shifte induce a negative correlation between real interest rates and
growth rates. If changes in budgetary policies aze at least as significant as technological
shocks, then one would not expect a significant correlation between realinterest rates
and growth ratee.
V.3 Differencea in Growfh Ratu~
Up to now the analysis hae been conducted under the assumption that all
pazameters apart from the B's are the same in both countries. It would be worth
investigating which parameters would make for differencee in growth rates. To see that,
we need look no further than the asset market equilibrium conditions (43) and (44).
Asauming that the adjustment cost pazameters also differ across countriee, the ateady
state versions of these equilibrium conditions are given by,
9-1 tP~i~~-1}~~ i
(r(t)fóJq(t) -
- n~e~~ ~~ n-1-~~~~~ P- n~e~~~ 1 i-n-~~r~l 2
(50)
(51)
From (50) and (51), the equilibrium ratio of the capital stocks in the two countries
is given by,3Q
(K1~-1-1 f 1 ~~f{[ 1 ~~~f~e~}1,Q~ ~0
l~J -~ l n~ v~ t Y~s n~ ~ a ~
It is straightforward to ahow that in equilibrium ontput will be proportional to the
capital stock in both countriea, with the factor of proportionality depending on the
equilibrium ratio of capital atocka. It ie also straightforwazd to show that if Bi~B~, then
K~~Kz. In addition, if {bi~r~, then K~~Kz. These implications aze atraightforwazd.
Capital will be attracted to the country in which it has the higher mazginal
productivity, and the country with the higher adjustment costs for investment. The
reason for the latter result is that the country with the higher adjustmeat costs for
investment will need to have a lower gross inveatment rate in equilibrium if the q's are
equal. If the countriea etart with the same capital atock, the country with the higher
investment adjuatment costs will have a higher q, and will therefore attract additional
capital, until the ratio of the gross investment rates equals the inverse of the ratio oí the
adjustment cost pazametera in the two countries, a condition that guazantees the
equality of q's.
To examine differencea in growth rates, we can use the condition that the grosa
investment rate is equal to the depreciation rate plus the growth rate. Substituting this
condition in (45), we get that,
~ii7~-hó~ - 1~r[7a~-6s~ (52)
From (52), the country which, other things equal, faces higher adjustment costs
for inveatment, will end up with a lower endogenous growth rate, as it will need to have
a lower gross investment rate in equilibrium. In addition, the country which, other
things equal, facea a higher depreciation rate of its capital stock will also end up with a31
lower endogenous growth rate, as for a given rate of gross investment the aet investment
rate, and therefore the growth rate aze lower.
VI. CiOIICIl1310II3
This paper has examiaed the implications of budgetazy policies for growth,
international borrowing and lending, and the relation between economic growth, real
interest rates and the stock mazket valuation of firms. We have used a two~ountry
model of overlapping generations and endogenous growth, in which the oaly difíerence
between countries is in the effiàency of production. We have demonstrated that in the
presence of perfect capital mobility, the mazginal productivity of capital and
endogenous growth rates aze equalized across countries, and that per capita output
levels do not converge. Only differences in adjustment COete for investment or the
depreciation rate of the capital stock can induce differences in growth rates in this
model with international spillovers and perfect capital mobility. Countries whose firms
find it more costly to adjust their capital atock, and countriee which face higher
depreciation rates will end up with lower equilibrium growth rates.
A rise in average public debt to GDP ratios, or the GDP share of pnblic
consumption, reduces the global growth rate. The average GDP share of private
coneumption rises following a rise in average public debt, while it ialls following a rise in
the GDP shaze of public consumption. However, in the latter case there is leas than full
crowding~ut, and this is the reason that the global savings rate falls and growth slows
down.
A relative rise in the public debt to GDP ratio in one country cauaea a reduction
in its external assets to GDP ratio. Its relative GDP share of private consumption rises,
but then gradually falls as the country experiences higher current account defiáts, and
decumulates foreign assets. In the new steady state, its relative savings rate will be32
either higher or lower than be~fore the chaage, depeading on whether the real intereat
rate exceeda the growth rate or vice-versa. A relative rise in the GDP share of public
consumption in one country will cauae a relative reduction in the GDP share of private
consumption. However, as there is less that full crowding-out becauae of overlapping
generationg, its relative national eavings rate will fall. Thia will bring about higher
current account deficits and a gradual reduction in ita external assets to GDP ratio.
This reduction will cause a gradual rise in ite relative GDP share of private savings,
which will eventually atop the external asset decumulation.
In the preaence oí adjuatment coata for inveatment, the global growth rate is lower
than otherwiae. There is a poaitive correlation between the atock mazket value oí 5rms
and the growth rate. An average tax financed riae in the public debt to GDP ratio, or
the GDP ahare of private consumption, reducea growth and the stock market and
increasea world real intereat rates.
This model goes a long way towards accounting for the events of the 1980a in
terms of budgetary policieg. It does not only explain the wordwide rise in real intereat
rates and the decumulation of external asaeta in the United States relative to Western
Europe and Japan, but it also explains the generalized slowdown in economic growth.
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